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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GLENN BASS and LOIS BASS, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
MAJESTIC MEADOWS, a Limited 
partnership, dba MAJESTIC 
MEADOWS MOBILE HOME PARK; 
TOMMY SPILKER; FLOYD TRIMBLE; 
EVELYN TRIMBLE; GEORGE H. 
ROSE; and PLANNED MANAGEMENT 
SERVICES, INC., a Utah cor-
poration, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19,182 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiffs brought suit seeking damages from defendants 
for alleged conspiracy by defendants to dispossess 
plaintiffs of their mobile home and personal property. 
Plaintiffs also claimed unlawful and forcible entry, 
unlawful detainment of possession, and false and malicious 
statements about plaintiffs' mobile home. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable Christine M. 
Durham on Wednesday and Thursday/ January 6 and 7, 1982. 
Co-defendants Floyd and Evelyn Trimble were not present at 
the trialf nor did they respond to the complaint, and were, 
therefore, found to be in default. The claim against 
defendant Spilker was settled for a nominal fee of $1.00. 
During the trial the charge of conspiracy was dismissed, 
there being insufficient evidence. 
On February 1, 1982 judgment was entered against 
defendants. The trial court found that defendants Trimble 
wrongfully forfeited their contract with the plaintiffs. It 
also found that defendant Planned Management Services, Inc. 
(hereinafter PMS), manager of Majestic Meadows Mobile Home 
Park, was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior 
for the actions of its employee, defendant Spilker. Spilker 
was found to have slandered plaintiffs1 title to the mobile 
home and to have committed trespass and forcible entry. PMS 
was held liable for the reasonable rental value of the 
mobile home for the period of trespass (10 days), and for 
attorney's fees for slander of title, although the court 
found no actual damages by reason of such slander. 
f 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant PMS seeks a reversal of the lower court's 
decision and a judgment in favor of PMS, of no cause of 
action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
About the middle of October, 1976, plaintiffs and 
defendants Trimble entered into an agreement, whereby 
plaintiffs leased the Trimbles1 mobile home with an option 
to buy. (r.209-10, 344, 392) The contract was to terminate 
as of October 31, 1978. (r. 496) A short time thereafter, 
the plaintiffs moved the mobile home into Majestic Meadows 
Mobile Home Park. (r. 215-18) 
During the following eighteen months bad feelings 
developed between the plaintiffs and defendant Spilker over 
the plaintiffs' alleged failure to comply with some rules 
and regulations of the mobile home park. (r. 234, 419-20) 
Repeated violations of the park's rules led to a notice of 
termination on May 24, 1978 (r. 239-40) and a legal action 
for restitution in June. On August 18, 1978 a writ of 
restitution was issued by Judge Maurice D. Jones of the 
Fifth Circuit Court, (r.379, 489-90, 492) Two days before, 
on August 16, the plaintiffs engaged the services of Mr. 
Raymond W. Neidert, a real estate agent, to sell the mobile 
3 
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home. (r. 358) The plaintiffs then remained in the mobile 
home until sometime around the 4th of October 1978. (r. 386) 
Sometime during the summer months of that year, 
defendants Trimble somehow (the facts are in dispute) became 
aware of the plaintiffs being in arrears in their payments 
on the mobile home. (r. 256, 392, 460-461) Within a short 
time thereafter, defendants Trimble engaged an attorney to 
handle the matter for them since they lived at that time in 
North Dakota, (r. 310) Upon notification of the situation 
the plaintiffs contacted the Trimblefs attorney and offered 
him payment in the form of a check, (r. 213-14) In 
attempting to certify the check, the attorney testified that 
the plaintiffs1 bank told him there were insufficient funds 
to cover the check, (r. 315-16) By mid-October the 
plaintiffs were still in arrears. During this time 
defendants Trimble had made at least two trips to Utah and 
had visited defendant Spilker and informed him that they 
intended to repossess the mobile home if payments were not 
made by the plaintiffs, (r. 463) 
About mid-October 1978, after the plaintiffs had 
vacated the home, Spilker became concerned about the 
possible theft of some of the plaintiffs1 personal property 
which had been left in open view. (r.438-40) Spilker 
4 
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discussed his concerns with PMS's attorney, Robert Baldwin, 
who was aware of the forthcoming repossession and had been 
in contact with the Trimble's attorney. After clearance from 
PMSfs attorney, Spilker moved plaintiffs' property into the 
mobile home and changed the locks on October 20, 1978. 
(r.438-40,488) 
By October 31, 1978 the plaintiffs had failed to 
exercise their option to purchase; on this date the contract 
between defendants Trimble and the plaintiffs expired under 
its own terms, and defendants Trimble repossessed the mobile 
home. In letters dated November 10, 1978, the Trimble's 
attorney notified the plaintiffs and their attorney that the 
terms of their agreement had expired and that the mobile 
home had been repossessed, (r. 324, 346) Four days prior, on 
November 6, 1978, Trimbles wrote Spilker a letter in which 
they notified him of their repossession of the mobile home 
and in which they asked him to list the mobile home for sale 
at $28,500. (r. 452) Spilker found a buyer for the mobile 
home shortly thereafter, (r. 353) 
During the trial the plaintiffs' real estate agent, Mr. 
Neidert, claimed that Spilker had harassed him in his 
attempts to sell the mobile home and discouraged buyers from 
purchasing the mobile home. (r. 370, 372, 380) Defendant 
5 
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Spilker testified that he only told prospective buyers that 
there were some legal uncertainties about the mobile home, / 
and that these legal questions would need to be resolved 
before a purchase of the mobile home could be complete. 
(r. 443, 447, 457) 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING SLANDER OF TITLE, THE 
PLAINTIFFS HAVING FAILED TO PROVE A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR 
SLANDER OF TITLE. 
In defining slander of title the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina has said: 
Slander of title of property may be 
committed and published orally or by writing, 
printing, or otherwise, and the gist of the 
action is the special damage sustained; and, 
unless the plaintiff shows the falsity of the 
words published, the malicious intent with which 
they were uttered, and a pecuniary loss or 
injury to himself, he cannot maintain the 
action. If the alleged infirmity of the title 
exists, the action will not lie, however 
malicious the intent to injure may have been, 
because no one can be punished in damages for 
speaking the truth. Cardon v. McConnell, 120 
N.C. 461, 27 S.E. 109 (1897). 
There are then, essentially four elements of slander of 
title: (1) Words actually affecting title; (2) Falsity; (3) 
Malice; (4) Special damages. Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., 116 
Utah 106, 208 P.2d 956 (1949); McNichols v. Conejos-k 
Corp., 482 P.2d 432 (Colo. App., 1971) at 434. 
6 
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A. TITLE. 
In slander of title cases, it is obviously the 
plaintiff's burden to prove possession of title to the 
alleged slandered property, and to prove that title has been 
clouded by the defendant's statements. Dowse v. Doris Trust 
Co., supra; South Louisiana Land Co. v. Riggs Cypress Co., 
119 La. 193, 43 So. 1003 (1907). 
In the instant case the only evidence of title offered 
was an undated, handwritten Private and Personal Agreement 
between defendants Trimble and plaintiffs. Further evidence 
might have been submitted had title been an issue in the 
case. However, since slander of title was never plead, and 
in fact was never mentioned in the pleadings or during the 
course of the trial, no evidence to prove this particular 
point was ever submitted. 
In regards to any cloud having been placed upon the 
plaintiffs' title, absolutely no evidence was offered by the 
plaintiffs to show that their title had been clouded by 
defendant Spilker's statements. 
B. FALSITY. 
" [I]f the alleged defamatory matter is true, an action 
will not lie, however malicious the intent to injure may 
have been." 50 Am. Jur. 2d 1067, Libel and Slander, 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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section 549. "For one to be liable for slander of title he 
must publish matter which is untrue and disparaging to 
another's property in land." Pender v. Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 
328, 265 P.2d 644, 649, (1954). 
As to the truthfulness of defendant Spilker's 
statements the trial court found that he If[m]ade false 
statements to...at least one person (Doan) interested in 
purchasing the property and to the plaintiffs' real estate 
agent." (r. 121) No person named Doan ever testified at 
trial. However, the plaintiffs' real estate agent, Mr. 
Neidert, did mention someone named Dos or Don, but he never 
testified that any false statements had been made: 
Q. Okay. Did you have occasion to be 
thwarted in any of your efforts, from your 
standpoint, in the sale of the home? 
A. As I understand it, the park reserves 
the right to okay or not okay somebody that 
wanted to buy the place. And I can't recall any 
names. At the time I didn't — you know. Had I 
known it was going to happen, we would have kept 
records. I don't know who these people were 
other than the people across the street. Do you 
want me to get into that? 
Q. Yes. I am trying to elicit that. 
A. Yeah. We had some other people that were 
really interested. That was my understanding. 
But it was my understanding when they got back 
to me that the manager didn't want them in 
there. 
Q. All right. 
8 
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A. Or he didnft want us to sell it. That 
was the biggest problem. But that Dosf or Don, 
who lived across the street, was really 
interested, and he too was told by the 
management — 
Mr. Fillerup: I need foundation, (r. 
363-64) 
Mr. Fillerup, defendant PMS's counsel, then objected on the 
basis that Neidert's recitation of what someone else may 
have told him about what Spilker may have told them was 
hearsay; and, after after a lengthy argument, plaintiffs1 
counsel dropped the question with no evidence of any alleged 
false statements being received, (r.364-68) 
Mrs. Bass, a plaintiff in this action, testified that 
she overheard a conversation between Neidert, Spilker, and 
the neighbors from across the street, the Daubs (r. 405, 
412), in which Spilker told the Daubs there were legal 
problems with the mobile home. Mrs. Bass never testified 
Spilker said anything that affected their title to the 
mobile home, only that there were legal problems. 
Spilker also testified about a conversation with a Mr. 
Daub (r. 467-69), another resident of the park who wanted to 
purchase the plaintiffs1 mobile home below market value and 
then have Spilker sell the home at market value for a large 
profit. Defendant Spilker's testimony about this 
conversation and his refusal to be a party to such a scheme 
9 
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contains nothing about the plaintiffs1 title to the mobile 
home, let alone anything that might be considered as a false 
statement regarding the mobile home. 
Whether the person to whom Spilker allegedly made false 
statements was named Doan, Dos, Don, or Daub, no evidence 
was ever received that false statements were in fact made. 
As regarding false statements having been made by Mr. 
Spilker to the plaintiffs1 real estate agent, Mr. Neidert, 
no evidence that the statements were false was presented. 
Mr. Neidert only testified that Spilker questioned whether 
he had a license to sell a mobile home, and that "[Spilker] 
didn't want anybody selling mobile homes in there." (r. 372) 
Mr. Neidert also testified that Spilker mentioned pending 
legal matters, but also stated that until the day of the 
trial he was never aware that there actually were legal 
matters concerning the mobile home. (r. 377-79) None of what 
Neidert testified Spilker said were false statements, nor 
were they statements that could in anyway affect the 
plaintiffs1 title to the mobile home. Since Spilker1s 
statements were true they cannot constitute slander of 
title. Cardon v. McConnell, supra; McNichols v. Conejos-K 
Corp., supra. 
10 
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C. MALICE. 
As to malice, statements made, even if false, cannot 
constitute a slander, unless the statements were made 
maliciously. Cardon v. McConnell, supra. Malice is an 
essential ingredient in a claim of slander of title. 
Den-Gar Enterprises v. Romero, 94 N.M. 425, 611 P.2d 1119 
(N.M. App. 1980). 
Even if the statements had been false, the trial 
judge found that there was no malice on the part of 
defendant Spilker: 
The court further finds that Mr. Spilker 
interfered with the Basses1 effort to sell their 
trailer home prior to November 1st, 1978, and !_ 
can make no finding that that was malicious, 
willful, or wanton, (r. 601 emphasis added) 
D. SPECIAL DAMAGES 
No cause of action exists for slander of title absent 
proper pleading and proof of special damage: 
The rule is generally recognized that special 
damage is a necessary element of a cause of 
action for slander of title or disparagement of 
goods or property and that the special damages 
recoverable must be such as proximately flow 
from the slander uttered. General damages are 
not presumed to result from the disparagement or 
defamation, and there could be no recovery if 
resultant injury is not shown. 50 Am. Jur. 2d. 
1065, Libel and Slander, section 546. See also 
Jemez Properties, Inc. v. Locero, 94 N.M. 181, 
608 P.2d 157, 162 (1980) ("[slpecial damages 
must be pleaded as well as proved in a suit for 
slander of title.") 
11 
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Utah law is in complete accord with the foregoing. In 
Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., supra; the Utah Supreme Court 
outlined the following as necessary elements to prove a 
cause of slander of title: 
Although the falsity of the statement and malice 
or lack of the privilege to do so in the 
disparagement of title are two important 
elements in a suit for slander of title, a 
plaintiff in a suit for slander of title, unlike 
a plaintiff in a suit for libel and slander of 
his person, cannot prevail unless he alleges and 
proves a pecuniary loss resulting from the act 
of the defendant. Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., 
supra at 958 (emphasis added) 
In another slander of title case, Western States 
Title Insurance Co. v. Warnock, 18 Utah 2d 70, 415 P.2d 316 
at 318 (1966), this Court held that "[w]ithout an allegation 
of special damage there can be no recovery on what is 
alleged in the plaintiff's [complaint]." These examples show 
that it is a well established rule that special damages must 
be plead and proved in slander of title cases, fl[t]he gist 
of the action [being] the special damage sustained." Cardon 
v. McConnell, supra. 
In the instant case the plaintiffs failed to plead and 
prove special damages. The only claim in the plaintiffs' 
complaint which remotely resembles one for special damages 
is that "[p]laintiffs were unable to sell [their mobile 
12 
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home] and have been completely dispossessed thereof" (r. 6) 
and that plaintiffs suffered the loss of certain personal 
property. No other allegation of special damage can be 
found. Regarding this claim for special damage for failure 
to sell the mobile home, the trial court held that the 
plaintiffs failed to adequately prove it resulted from the 
defendants' actions: 
Plaintiffs failed to establish with the required 
degree of certainty that their failure to sell 
the property and obtain the profit therefrom was 
proximately caused by the defendants' actions, 
and therefore no damages can be awarded to 
compensate them for a lost sale. (r. 162) 
Attorney's fees alone, absent special circumstances, 
cannot constitute the special damages necessary to be proved 
to find a slander. Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., supra; and 
Western States Title Insurance Co. v. Warnock, supra. 
In her conclusions of law the trial judge noted that 
the plaintiffs were entitled to attorney's fees based upon 
the court's opinion in Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., supra. 
In Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., the defendant filed for 
record an instrument which unequivocably and indelibly 
clouded and slandered the plaintiff's title. The lower court 
awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees incurred in expunging 
the cloud on his title as an element of special damage, and 
13 
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the Supreme Court affirmed. In Dowse v. Doris Trust Co, 
because the slander of title was in written form and filed 
for record against the plaintiff's title to the property, 
the slander was continuing, and the plaintiff had no choice 
but to bring an action to remove the cloud. The expenditure 
of attorney's fees associated with such an action, the court 
concluded, was a reasonably foreseeable special damage which 
resulted from the defendant's conduct. 
The present case is completely distinguishable because 
the plaintiffs were not required to bring this action to 
expunge a continuing cloud on their title to the mobile 
home. Indeed, they did not bring this action to expunge a 
cloud on their title at all. 
E. FAILURE TO PLEAD OR PURSUE A CLAIM FOR SLANDER OF TITLE 
The final, and the most perplexing point of all, is that 
neither the term "slander of title" nor the concept of "slander 
of title" was even mentioned in the pleadings or throughout the 
trial, including the closing arguments of counsel. In fact, 
counsel for plaintiffs conceded in closing that plaintiffs were 
alleging only the causes of action as originally in the 
complaint, (r. 583). Also, when Judge Durham, the trial 
judge, made her initial findings, she made absolutely no 
mention of "slander of title" (r. 600-610). The issue of 
14 
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slander of title did not even arise until Judge Durham 
entered her ruling, (r. 120-122, 121). Obviously defense 
counsel was surprised by the ruling and eventually objected 
thereto, (r. 130) but even counsel for plaintiffs, in the 
subsequent hearing on attorneyfs fees held before Judge 
Fishier, conceded that he had never entertained the concept 
of slander of title in -the lawsuit, (r. 616) As a result, 
plaintiff did not press the issue of slander of title at the 
trial, and consequently failed to present evidence 
sufficient to justify a finding of slander of title. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO 
PLAINTIFFS FOR THE 10 DAY PERIOD IN OCTOBER, 1978. 
The trial court found that: 
(3) ... [Spilker] committed a trespass, 
conversion of, or forcible entry upon the 
property for the period between October 20, 1978 
and the date Trimbles "forfeited" (albeit 
wrongfully) the plaintiffs contract. Plaintiffs 
are entitled to judgment against Spilker's 
employer, Planned Management Services, Inc., for 
the reasonable rental value of the property for 
the period of conversion or trespass, ... 
(4) The reasonable rental value of the 
property was the same amount being paid to 
Valley Bank on Trimbles' mortgage. That amount 
should be prorated to determine the amount of 
judgment as set forth in Conclusion #2 about. 
[#3 above.] (r. 162) 
These conclusions of the trial court-are apparently 
15 
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These conclusions of the trial court are apparently 
based upon the findings of fact that: 
(4)(b). [Spilker] changed the locks on 
the property on or about October 20, 1978, 
without the plaintiff's consent or permission. 
Removed the lockbox belonging to plaintiff's 
realtor, thereby denying to plaintiffs and their 
agent all access to the property. Made no tender 
or delivery of, or effort to tender or deliver, 
the keys to the new locks. 
(5) Plaintiffs did not at any time 
abandon or surrender the property. When they 
moved out, it was with the intent to permit 
their realtor to show the property and to sell 
it in their behalf. They were entitled to 
possession. There was no evidence of any intent 
to abandon, and defendant Spilker's changing of 
the locks was not in good faith, (r. 161) 
The problem with the trial court's findings is that 
they are not supported by the record, and in fact the record 
indicates just the contrary. Granted, there was testimony by 
plaintiffs about Spilker's attempts to get the plaintiffs to 
list their mobile home for sale through him, and he may have 
represented that there were pending legal problems with the 
mobile home in light of the writ of restitution that had 
been issued, but Mrs. Bass, herself, admitted in cross 
examination that neither she nor her husband, nor anyone she 
could identify, had actually been deprived access to the 
home. She further indicated that neither she nor her husband 
made any demand to enter the mobile home after the locks 
were changed. 
16 
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Q. [by Mr. Fillerup] All right. Itfs 
true, isn't it, that Mr. Spilker never told you 
that you absolutely couldn't sell your mobile 
home if you didn't list it with him? He never 
told you that? 
A. [Mrs. Bass] Not in those words, 
no. 
Q. He just tried to encourage you to-
list it with him? 
A. He told us that we needed to go 
through him to sell it. Take it any way you want 
to. 
Q. You were never present when Mr. 
Spilker or anyone ever, himself, ever prohibited 
anyone from viewing your mobile home, were you? 
A. I was present on the day with 
Wally Neidert and the Daubs. 
Q. Of course they were already in the 
park and had gone through the mobile home? 
A. As far as I know, they had already 
gone through the mobile home. 
Q. And you personally weren't present 
or don't know, or your own personal knowledge, 
of any incidents where anyone was prohibited 
from seeing your mobile home? 
A. No. 
Q. You also have no knowledge or were 
never present where you made demand to enter the 
mobile home and refused [sic] to do that? 
A. No. We were advised by Mr. 
Ungricht not to do that. 
Q. So your attorney told you not to 
go back? 
A. He told us not to contact Mr. 
Spilker or anybody else and make demands to go 
into the home after they changed the locks. 
Q. I see. And so you never made any 
demand after the locks were changed? 
A. No. We left that in his hands. He 
said he would take care of that. 
Q. So you don't know whether you 
could have or couldn't have gone back and picked 
up your furnace and hot water heater, for 
instance, personally? 
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A. Personally, I guess not. I guess 
I'd have to say I didn't make the demands, nor 
my husband, (r. 411 - 413) 
The testimony of Mr. Spilker is consistent with that 
of Mrs. Bass: 
Q. [by Mr. Fillerup] Now, Tommy, did 
you ever tell either the guard or anyone else 
associated with Planned Management not to allow 
the Basses access to their mobile home? 
A. No, sir. I was very careful in 
that. 
Q. Did you ever have any demand made 
upon you by either Mr. or Mrs. Bass to enter 
their mobile home? 
A. Never. 
Q. They never even asked you if they 
could? 
A. I never saw them, sir. 
Q. How about after the locks were 
changed? Did you ever have anybody request that 
they be allowed to enter the mobile home? 
A. Never. 
Q. On behalf of the Basses? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How about Mr. Neidert? Did you 
ever deny him access to the mobile home? 
A. No, sir. I told him to contact us, 
and my wife was present. When I asked him to 
take the signs out I told him to please contact 
us, I told the guard to have him contact us day 
or night, sir. That was instructions they had, 
too, if he ever came in. (r. 456 - 457) 
Mr. Neidert, who also testified on behalf of the 
plaintiffs, admitted that he had never been denied access to 
the mobile home after the locks were changed: 
Q. [by Mr. Fillerup] All right. Thank 
you. It's true, isn't it, Mr. Neidert, that you 
personally were never denied access to the 
mobile home when you requested it? 
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A. Well, I never had to request it, 
because I had a key to the place. But I was 
denied when the key box was taken off. 
Q. Temporarily? 
A. I never got in after that. 
Q. Did you ever demand to get in 
after that? 
A. I was kind of out of the picture 
by that time. 
Q. But did you ever demand to get in 
like [after] that? 
A. Not that I recall. I don't know. I 
would doubt it. I don't know. 
Q. You never went to Mr. Spilker 
after the time the locks were changed and said, 
"I want to get in there and show somebody that 
mobile home"? You never did that, did you? 
A. I honestly don't know. 
Q. Prior to the time the locks were 
changed, though, the guard or Mr. Spilker or 
someone else never denied you any access, 
stopped you at the entry and said, "I'm sorry, 
but you can't go in there anyway"? 
A. No. No one ever stopped me. But 
they just tried to discourage me. (r. 383 - 384) 
Mr. Bass testified that on one occasion the guard 
told him that he had no business in the park and not to come 
in, but he could not identify the date or whether it was 
after the locks were chainged. (r. 275 - 277). 
There is no question that Tommy Spilker changed the 
locks on the coach on October 20, 1978. He testified that he 
did so at the direction of Bob Baldwin, attorney for PMS. He 
further testified that the reason for the lock change was 
because he had to break off the old lock to move a water 
heater and furnace inside that had been left behind by the 
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Basses. He was concerned that the items had been left out 
where they could be damaged or stolen, (r. 438 - 440). 
The evidence presented by plaintiffs as to why Mr. 
Spilker changed the locks concerned what Spilker may have 
said to prospective buyers and Mr. Neidert, the inference 
being that he changed the locks to prevent a sale of the 
mobile home. Howeverf absolutely no evidence was ever 
offered to show that Spilker or PMS ever denied plaintiffs, 
Mr. Neidert, or prospective purchasers any access to the 
mobile home. In fact, Spilker testified that he went to Mr. 
Neidert's office after the locks were changed to inform 
Neidert of what he had done. (r. 457a - 458). 
The court concluded, however, that by changing the 
locks Spilker denied to plaintiffs and their agent all 
access to the property. Such conclusion is not supported by 
any evidence, and is clearly in error. 
Juxtaposed to the above problem is the fact that a 
writ of restitution had issued in favor of PMS against the 
plaintiffs in July of 1978, and that some 20 days before the 
locks were changed, plaintiffs had moved from the premises. 
Could Spilker have unlawfully detained the plaintiffs from 
the property when they were not possessing or attempting to 
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possess it and when they had no right to possess it in the 
first place? 
The finding by the trial court that PMS is 
responsible to plaintiffs for the trespass, conversion, or 
unlawful detainer is simply not supported by any evidence 
adduced at trial and as a result the judgment against PMS 
should be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
The courtfs finding of slander of title is 
erroneous, both in law and fact, was never plead or tried by 
plaintiffs, and appears to be an afterthought of the trial 
court to find a way to award attorney's fees to plaintiffs, 
even though the court found no actual damage had occurred. As 
a result, the award of attorneyfs fees must be set aside. 
Additionally, the award of damages for trespass, conversion 
or unlawful detainer is erroneous. This Court should reverse 
the judgment of the trial court and enter judgment in favor 
of defendant PMS, no cause of action. 
DATED this 14th day of July, 1983. 
Quo. ftL? 
ROBERT C. F I L L E R U P ] 
- Attorney for Appellants 
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